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Abstract 
We show that a social planner who seeks to allocate a given sum in order to reduce efficiently 
the social stress of a population, as measured by the aggregate relative deprivation of the 
population, pursues a disbursement procedure that is identical to the procedure adhered to by 
a Rawlsian social planner who seeks to allocate the same sum in order to maximize the 
Rawlsian maximin-based social welfare function. Thus, the constrained minimization of 
aggregate relative deprivation constitutes an economics-based rationale for the philosophy-
based constrained maximization of the Rawlsian social welfare function. 
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1. Introduction 
In an extensive review of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, which was published 45 years 
ago, Kenneth Arrow raised a number of concerns. A strong common denominator of Arrow’s 
criticisms of assumptions, certain aspects, and implications for economic policy of the 
Theory, is the lack of an economics-based foundation for Rawls’s Theory. One of many 
examples of that is: “My critical stance is derived from a particular tradition of thought: that 
of welfare economics” (Arrow, 1973, p. 246). In a second review of A Theory of Justice, also 
published 45 years ago, by Scott Gordon, the core of the criticism of the Theory once again 
was that as a prescription for achieving optimal allocation, the Theory is not based on 
economics ground rules. In the long time since the publication of Rawls’s book and the 
critical reviews referred to above, it has not been shown that the allocation advocated by 
Rawls is, in fact, a mirror image of an allocation protocol that emanates from economics-
based algorithms which, in themselves, arise from bricks and mortar principles of welfarism 
and utilitarianism.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide such a link. We unravel a novel congruence: 
the manner in which a social planner will allocate a given sum in order to minimize the social 
stress of a population, as measured by the aggregate relative deprivation, ARD, of the 
population, is identical to the manner in which a Rawlsian social planner will allocate the 
same sum in order to maximize the Rawlsian maximin-based social welfare function. Thus, 
the constrained minimization of ARD can be conceived as an economics-based rationale for 
the philosophy-based constrained maximization of the Rawlsian social welfare function. The 
equivalence of the two optimization procedures is illuminating. In spite of extensive attention, 
different interpretations, and controversies in economics and beyond related to the approach 
of Rawls to social welfare, a rigorous demonstration from an economics-based stance of the 
optimality of the Rawlsian-guided procedure of allocating or disbursing a given sum has not 
been provided.1  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Notable examples of criticisms of and controversies related to the approach of Rawls to social welfare are 
Harsanyi (1975), and Sen (2009); see also the “Symposium on The Idea of Justice” in the 2011, Vol. 5 issue of 
the Indian Journal of Human Development. 
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2. The Rawlsian social welfare function 
The Rawlsian approach to social welfare, built on the foundation of the “veil of ignorance,”2 
measures the welfare of a society by the wellbeing of the worst-off individual (the maximin 
criterion). Rawls argues that if individuals were to select the concept of justice by which a 
society is to be regulated without knowing their position in that society - the “veil of 
ignorance” - they would choose principles that involve the least undesirable condition for the 
worst-off member over utilitarian principles. This hypothetical contract is the basis of the 
Rawlsian society, and of the Rawlsian maximin social welfare function. An individual who is 
positioned behind the “veil of ignorance” and who does not know what particular income he 
will end up having, will rationally choose “conservatively” (as if he were highly risk averse), 
thus be inclined to “vote” for a Rawlsian social welfare function; the prospect of ending up 
being the worst-off member of the population looms large.  
For population N consisting of n individuals whose incomes are represented by the 
ordered vector 1( ,..., )nx x x , where 1 2 ... nxx x   , the Rawlsian social welfare function, 
( )RSWF x , is 
  
{1,..., }
( ) min ( )R
i
i
n
SWF ux x

 , 
where ( )iu x  
is the utility function of individual i. This utility depends positively on individual 
i’s income, ix . In his writings, Rawls referred to primary goods which include basic rights 
and liberties, and income and wealth. It is the economists, with their strong interest in 
conceptualizing and measuring social welfare and income distribution, who, when reviewing 
the Rawlsian stance, singled out income for analysis.  
 
3. Aggregate relative deprivation 
We quantify the social stress of a population by the sum of the levels of social stress 
experienced by the individuals who constitute the population. As in Stark (2013), we measure 
the social stress of an individual by his relative deprivation. Also in line with the definition of 
relative deprivation in Stark (2013), we resort to income-based comparisons, namely an 
individual feels relatively deprived when others in his comparison group earn more than he 
                                                 
2 “[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 118.) 
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does. To concentrate on essentials, we assume that the comparison group of each individual 
consists of all members of his population. Thus, we measure the social stress of an individual 
by the extra income units that others in the population have, we sum up these excesses, and 
we divide the sum by the size of the population. This approach, inspired by the pioneering 
two-volume work of Stouffer et al. (1949), tracks the seminal work of Runciman (1966) and 
its articulation by Yitzhaki (1979), Hey and Lambert (1980), Ebert and Moyes (2000), Bossert 
and D’Ambrosio (2006), and Stark et al. (2017a). Adding together the levels of relative 
deprivation experienced by all the individuals belonging to a given population yields the 
aggregate relative deprivation (ARD) of the population. We refer to this sum as the social 
stress of the population. 
For population N characterized in the preceding section we define the relative 
deprivation of individual i, iRD , whose income is ix  as 
 1
for 
1
 ( 1,..., 1,
 
for
)
  .0
n
j i
j ii
ix x
nRD
n
i n
 



 



 (1) 
Multiplying and dividing the formula in the first line of (1) by the number of the individuals 
whose incomes are higher than the income of individual i yields an equivalent measure: iRD  
is the fraction of those in the population whose incomes are higher than the income of 
individual i times their mean excess income. Formally, let ( )iF x  be the fraction of those in 
population N whose incomes are smaller than or equal to ix . The relative deprivation of an 
individual whose income is ix  is 
    1 ( ) |i i i iRD F x E x x x x     . (2) 
To obtain (2), we multiply 
1
n
 in (1) by the number of the individuals whose incomes are 
higher than ix , and we divide 
1
( )
n
j i
j i
x x
 
  in (1) by this same number. We then obtain two 
ratios: the first is the fraction of the population whose incomes are higher than the income of 
individual i, namely  1 ( )iF x ; the second is the mean excess income, namely 
 |i iE x x x x  . This representation of iRD  is used in the construction of the algorithm in the 
next section. 
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The aggregate relative deprivation of population N, NARD , is the sum of the levels of 
relative deprivation experienced by the individuals belonging to N,  
 
1
1
n
N
i
i
ARD RD


  
1
1 1
1 n n
i j
j i
i
x x
n

  
  .  
Remark. An alternative rewrite of (1) provides a novel interpretation of iRD . We 
denote by 
1
1
j
j
i
n
i
x x
n i  


  the average income of the individuals whose incomes are higher 
than the income of individual i. Then  
1
1
1
( ) ( )
n
jn
j i
j ii ii i
j i
x
n i n i n i
x x x x x
n in n
RD
n i n
 
 
 
    
         


 , 
namely the relative deprivation of individual i is the product of two terms: the relative 
distance of his rank from the top-ranked individual (the rank of the latter individual, whose 
income is the highest in N, is 1), and the distance of individual i’s income from the mean 
income of the individuals whose incomes are higher than the income of individual  i. 
 
4. The algorithm of minimizing ARD  
Consider population N of size n with an ordered income vector 1( ,..., )nx x x , and let there be 
a social planner who has an amount T to be distributed at no cost among members of the 
population. We denote by   a subset of individuals from N whose incomes are the lowest. 
We analyze what happens when marginally, and by the same amount, we increase the 
incomes of the individuals in  , where a marginal increase refers to an increase such that the 
incomes of these individuals will not become higher than the income of any individual outside 
the set  . 
First, suppose that the set   consists of just one individual out of the n members of 
the population, meaning that there is only one individual earning the lowest income; that is, 
1 ix x  for 2,...,i n . Suppose that the social planner appropriates a sum   to increase the 
income of this lowest-earning individual (namely individual 1), where   is small enough to 
satisfy our definition of a marginal increase in income; that is, 2 1x x   . Using (2), this 
individual’s relative deprivation decreases by 
1n
n


, because the mean excess income of the 
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fraction of 
1n
n

 individuals earning more than him is reduced by the amount  . At the same 
time, as this individual’s income was, and continues to be, the lowest in the population, this 
expenditure does not increase the relative deprivation of any other individual belonging to N. 
Therefore, the change in the aggregate relative deprivation of the population is equal to the 
decrease in the relative deprivation of individual 1, namely  
 
1N nARD
n


   . (3) 
We next show that upon spending   on a single individual, the term on the right-hand 
side of (3) is the highest marginal decrease in aggregate relative deprivation achievable. We 
do this by contradiction. Suppose that we were to increase by   not the income of the lowest-
earning individual, 1x , but, rather, the income of an individual earning 1ix x , where i N  
and 1i  , such that 1i ix x   , so as to abide by the condition of a marginal change. Then, 
the relative deprivation of individual i would decrease as a result of his income getting closer 
to the incomes of the individuals earning more than he does, but the relative deprivation of 
those individuals who earn less than individual i would increase. Namely when in  ( in ) is the 
number of the individuals earning strictly more (less) than ix , the change in the aggregate 
relative deprivation of the population would be  
 i i i i
N n n n nARD
n n n
  

      , (4) 
because the mean excess income of the fraction of i
n
n
 individuals earning more than ix  would 
fall by the amount  , yet, at the same time, the relative deprivation of each of the in  
individuals earning less than ix  would increase by 
n

. Because 1in   and in n , comparing 
(4) and (3) yields 
 
1i in n n
n n
 
 
 . (5) 
Thus, channeling the transfer   to an individual who is not the lowest income recipient in the 
population yields a lower decrease in aggregate relative deprivation than increasing by   the 
income of the individual who earns the lowest income. 
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Second, we consider a population N in which there are several individuals who earn 
the same income which constitutes the lowest income in the population, namely the set   
includes more than one individual. We denote by   the size of this set. Suppose again that 
the social planner appropriates the sum   to increase the earnings of each member of the 
subset   by 


. As in the case of a single individual who has the lowest income in the 
population, such a marginal transfer to each member of   does not change the relative 
deprivation of any of the individuals not belonging to  . Thus, the change in the aggregate 
relative deprivation in N arises only from a decrease of the relative deprivation sensed by the 
lowest-earning individuals in   whose incomes become closer to the incomes of the 
individuals earning more than they do. The fraction of the individuals in N who earn more 
than members of the set   is equal to 
n
n
 
, and the mean excess income of each individual 
who receives the transfer is reduced by 


. Therefore, each of the members of   
experiences a decrease in his relative deprivation equal to 
n
n
 

. With no individual in N 
experiencing an increase in his relative deprivation, this expenditure yields the following 
change in the aggregate relative deprivation  
 NARD
n n
n n


   
  

  . (6) 
As in the case of the set   consisting of a single individual, this is obviously the optimal use 
of   for any subset of individuals in the population. 
Drawing on the preceding reasoning, and assuming that the marginal efficiency cost of 
redistribution is zero, the cost-effective response to the lowering of social stress, as measured 
by aggregate relative deprivation, can be represented in the form of an algorithm, as follows.  
Algorithm 
1. Include in the set   all the individuals who earn the lowest income in the population. 
2. Proceed to increase simultaneously the incomes of the members of the set  , until (i) the 
amount T is exhausted, or (ii) the incomes of the members of the set   reach the income of 
the lowest-earning individual(s) who is (are) not a member (members) of this set, in which 
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case expand the set   by including him (them) in  . If condition (i) is met, then the 
procedure is completed. If condition (ii) is met, start from step 1 once again. Notice that the 
incomes of the pre-expansion members of the set   should be increased from the level 
already reached, that is, from the level equal to the income(s) of the individual(s) newly 
included. 
It is easy to ascertain the optimality of the protocol of the algorithm: at each step, we 
increase the incomes of those individuals who earn the least, so the decrease in the aggregate 
relative deprivation of the population is most effective, and no one experiences an increase of 
their relative deprivation in the process. Increasing the incomes from below is ratcheted up 
through the hierarchy of the individuals, and it ceases when the funds available for reducing 
the aggregate relative deprivation are exhausted.  
5. Congruence of the algorithm with the Rawlsian social welfare program 
Let there be a population of five individuals whose incomes are (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Let there be 
two social planners who are constrained not to reduce the incomes of members of the 
population.  
Consider first a Rawlsian social planner who seeks to increase social welfare by 
adhering to the maximin principle, and who has at his disposal three units of income. This 
planner will allocate the first unit of income to the individual with the lowest utility, that is, to 
the individual whose income is 1; the income vector will then become (2, 2, 3, 4, 5). 
Thereafter, the Rawlsian social planner will reach out to the now worst off, namely to the two 
individuals whose incomes are 2 each, and increase the incomes of each of these two 
individuals to 3, thereby obtain an income vector (3, 3, 3, 4, 5). Clearly, as the allocation 
proceeded, the identity of the worst-off individuals changed (first it was the individual whose 
income was initially 1, then these were the two individuals whose incomes were initially 1 
and 2). As is easily seen, the principle guiding the allocation of the income available for 
disbursement is to attend to the individuals from the bottom up.  
A social planner who seeks to minimize aggregate relative deprivation, ARD, will 
allocate the three units of income in exactly the same way; this was proved in the algorithm 
presented in the preceding section. Given that proof, it follows then that the constrained 
minimization of ARD can be construed as an economics-based rationale for administering the 
philosophy-based Rawlsian maximin-based social welfare program.  
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Naturally, there is a difference between the Rawlsian procedure and the ARD protocol 
in that the reasons for proceeding from the bottom up are not the same. This difference 
notwithstanding, a Rawlsian social planner with a “policy budget” of three units of income 
allocates these units in the very same way as a social planner who applies the ARD 
minimization protocol. 
The configuration presented in this section is not limiting; the same procedure applies 
to larger populations and to larger sums available for allocation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Even if a translation into mainstream economics of the voluminous work of Rawls can 
ingeniously take a one-line equation (as in Section 2 above), a task that has not as yet been 
met is to provide an economics-based rationale for the income allocation protocol chartered 
by the Rawlsian social welfare function. In policy formation, public choice, and public 
economics there is a menu of social welfare functions to choose from (including utilitarian, 
Bernoulli-Nash, and Rawlsian), and unless a particular condition holds under which the social 
planners of all stripes see eye to eye, each social welfare function can give rise to a different 
rule of income allocation and, when enacted, lead to different income distributions.3 In view 
of the general importance of choosing which social function to follow, it is necessary to have 
in place the underlying economics rationales. Hence the inquiry undertaken here. 
It is an intriguing finding that the pursuit of the Rawlsian social welfare program is 
equivalent to a cost-effective treatment of social stress. Because the direction taken in this 
chapter can be reversed, the reported congruence can be interpreted as the Rawlsian program 
providing a social welfare rationale, as well as a procedure, for addressing social stress. 
                                                 
3 Stark et al. (2017b) provide a condition under which the utilitarian, Rawlsian, and Bernoulli-Nash social 
planners come up with the same optimal income distribution when a tax and transfer procedure is subject to a 
deadweight loss. Stark et al. (2017b) further show that when the individuals’ utility functions exhibit a 
sufficiently high concern at having a low relative income, the optimal tax policies of all the social planners align. 
They characterize the consensus optimal income distribution - which is a distribution of equal incomes - and find 
that the intensity of the individuals’ concern at having a low relative income crowds out the preferences over 
income distribution harbored by particular social planners. 
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